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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
G.:\ \~L.:\XD, a

l~tah
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Respondent,
-vs.~L\LT LAKE ·COl~:KTY, STATE OF
UT~\l-l; Li\.1\lO~r:r B. GUNDERSI~X,
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\YlLLL:\).1 G. LARSON, Individually
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9280

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STA'rE).II~~N'r

OF F.A.CTS

This i~ an action, filed :Jlarch 18, 1960, in the 'l1 hird
District Court, brought by Gayland, a l~tah Corporation, against Salt Lake County and individual commissioners for a declaratory judg1nent declaring Title 8
of the Sa It Lake ( oun ty Ordinance unla''rful, illegal and
j
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of no force and effect, or for an order directing the
mernbers of the Board of County Commissioners of Salt
Lake County to appove the zoning amendment designed
to effectuate a change in zoning classification of the
property at 1300 East and 5600 South from Residential
R-2 to Commercial C-2. A recommendation for said
charge had previously been denied by the District Zoning Committee and had been approved by the Planning
Commission. The Salt Lake County Commission denied
the proposed amendment by a 2-1 vote on May 14, 1960.
The trial court ruled that Salt Lake County had
failed to establish a master plan but found that the evidence submitted does not establish that such failure
prejudiced the substantial rights of the Plaintiff.
The court determined, however that the Board of
County Commissioners should have approved and adopted the amendment to the zoning ordinance of Salt Lake
County and directed said con1missioners to approve and
adopt said amendment.
Under date of .~..t\..pril 26, 1960, over the signature
of Ray Van Cott Jr., Judge of the District Court, a
Decree was issued ordering that the individual defendants above named as 1nembers of the Board of County
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, l~tah be and they
\\Tere thereby required and directed to forthwith approve
and adopt an an1endn1ent to the zoning ordinances of
Salt Lake County, State of lTtah as recom1nended by
the Salt Lake County Planning Co1nmission rezoning
from zoning elassification Residential R-2 to Co1nrnercial
4
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C-:2 the follo\\·ing dPseribed traet of land in Salt Lake
Uounty, State of L~tah, to \Yit:
''Beginning at the point of intersection of the
center lines of 5600 South and 1300 East street;
thence North follo,ving along the center line of
1300 East street 813 feet; thenee West parallel
to 5600 ~outh street 650 feet; thence South parallel to 1300 East street to the center line of
5600 South street; thence East following along
the center line of last said street to the point of
beginning. All above described property located
in Section 17, To\vnship 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and ~Ieridian, containing approxinlately 10 acres.
OF POINrrs

HrrATE~IENT

POIN T I.
1

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ISSUING
ITS ORDER SINCE IT LACKS JURISDICTION TO ORDER
THE BOARD OF COUN'TY COl\1MISSIONERS TO PERFORM
A LEGISLATIVE AND DISCRETIONARY ACT.
POINT II.
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, IN AMENDING OR REFUSING TO AMEND ITS ORDINANCES, ACTS
IN A LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY AND AS SUCH THE MOTIVES PROMPTING ITS ACTION CANNOT BE INQUIRED
IN'TO. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, THEREFORE, IN HAVING MAKE FINDINGS UPON SAID MOTIVES AND BASING
ITS DECISION THEREON.
POINT III.
THE DENIAL BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY CO:'.IMISSIONERS TO ADOPT THE ZONING AMENDMEN'T WAS

5
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NOT AN ARBITRARY OR UNREASONABLE ACT, NOR
WAS IT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE DENYING THE REASONABLE EXERCISE O·F THE
POLICE POWER ON THE PART OF THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.

ARGUl\fEl\rr
POIN T I.
1

THE TRIAL COURT COMl\tiiTTED ERROR IN ISSUING
ITS ORDER SINCE IT LACKS JURISDICTION TO ORDER
THE BOARD OF COUN TY COlVIMISSIONERS TO PERFORM
A LEGISLATIVE AND DISCRETIONARY ACT.
1

The order of the trial court, directing the appellant
board to adopt an amendment re-zoning the land in
question sounds in the nature of a writ of mandate
(R-30). Although the historical pleadings for a writ of
mandamus have been abolished by the Utah rules of
civil procedure, 65B (a) the methods of obtaining the
same type of relief as was formerly given by the 'vrit
is now possible under present day pleadings as defined
by the Utah rules.
Rule 65 B (b) (3) of the l-tah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that relief 'viii be granted:
"'Vhere the relief sought is to compel any
. . . board or person to perform an act which
the la'v specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station."
The jurisdiction of the trial court to issue this
decree 1nust be founded upon a sho,,~ing by respondent
the respondent has a clear legal right to have the area
6
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in question re-zoned, and that there has been a violation
of a legal duty resting upon the appellant board to
adopt the proposed ordinance. \Vithout this sho,ving,
tlH~ reuH\d~· sought 1nust be \\·ithheld, and granting the
retnPd~r \\·ithout this showing constitutes error.
In the case of State ex rel Bishop v. ~loorehouse,
:;s l tah :z:~4, 11:2 P. 1G9, 171, the l; tah Supre1ne Court,
defining in \vhat instances n1andamus will issue, said:
r

~.

To warrant the court, in granting a
\\·rit against a public officer, suc-h a state of facts
n1u~t be presented as to show that the relator has
a clear right to the perfor1nance of the thing demanded, and that a corresponding duty rests upon
the officer to perform that particular thing. And
\vhen substantial doubt exists as to the duty
whose perfor1nance it is sought to coerce, or as
to the right or power of the officer to perform
such duty, the relief \Vill be \Vithheld.' vVhere there
is a discretion vested in the officer, the rule generally applied is stated h~· the author in section
-!1 of l\Ierrill, on l\Iandan1us, in the following
\\·orcl::-;:
~But the action of an officer in a Inatter \\·hich calls for the exercise of his discretion or
judg1nent will not be reviewed hy the \vrit of Inandainus unless he has been guilty of u clear and
\vilful disregard of his duty, or such action is
sho"\\rn to be extremely \vrong or flagrantly improper and unjust, so that the decision can only
be explained as the result of caprice, passion or
partiality.' In speaking of the general rule \\·hich
is ordinarily applied hy the courts in passing on
the question whether the \\·ri t should be granted
or \vithheld, Wood on 1\Iandamu~, etc., at page 51
of his \vork, says: ~And generally it may be said
that a mandamus \\'ill not be issued unless the
H

•

•
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duty it is sought to enforce is a legal duty, clear
and free from doubt, and the right of the party
seeking redress through this summary remedy is
equally clear.' " (Page 171)
The same
Rules of Civil
sought is the
the relief have

rule should apply under tl1e ne"\\r Utah
Procedure, since the re1nedy and relief
same, although the technical titles for
been abolished.

The appellant board, acting within its discretion,
by a two to on vote refuse·d to adopt the proposed amendment. (R-17) For the court now to order the board
to adopt legislation it has once refused is beyond the
po,ver of the court. Appellant submits that it is a fundamental proposition of government that the court may
not legislate. The judicial process is to interpret the
la,v, not to make the law. (See Conley, State's attorney,
ex rei. Rowell v. Boyle et al., 115 ·Conn. 406, 162 A. 26.)
Lacking the power to issue such an order the court
IS lacking in jurisdiction and thus erred in issuing its
decree.
POINT II.
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, IN Al\iENDING OR REFUSING TO AMEND ITS ORDINANCES, ACTS
IN A LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY AND AS SUCH THE MOTIVES PROMPTING ITS ACTION CANNOT BE INQUIRED
IN'TO. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, THEREFORE, IN HAVING MAKE FINDINGS UPON SAID MOTIVES AND BASING
ITS DECISION THEREON.

lJtah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 17, ·Chapter 27, Section 1, provides that the county con11nissioners of each
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

county a l'l' authorized and elnpo,,·ered to zone all or
any part of the unincorporat e<l terri toy of said county.
tTtah Code ..:\nnotated, 1953, Title 17, Chapter '27, Seetion 1-t, authorizes the ~unend1nent of said zoning ordinanc-es and provides procedures to be followed to
aeeo1nplish said amendrnents. Its language is as follows:
·~The

board of county comrnissioners may
fron1 ti1ne to ti1ne amend the number, shape,
boundaries or area of any district or districts,
or any regulation of or \vithin such district or
districts, or any other provisions of the zoning
resolution, but any such arnendrnent shall not
be n1ade or becorne effective unles:-5 the san1e
shall have been proposed h~r or be first subrnitted
for the approval, disapproval or suggestions of
the county planning comn1ission; and if disapproved by such commission \vithin thirty days
after such subrnission, such amendrnent, to become effective, shall receive the favorable vote
of not less than a majorit~· of the entire mernbership of the board of county connnissioners.
Before finally adopting any such amendment, the
board of county com1nissioners shall hold a public hearing thereon, at least thirty day's notice
of the time and place of \Yhich shall be given hy
at least one publication in a ne\vspaper of general
circulation in the county."
'rhat the adoption and arnend1nent of zoning ordinances
is a legislative function \vas decided by this court in
the case of Waltoll v. Tracy Loan and Trnst Co., et al.,
97 l;tah 2-±9, 92 Pac. :2nd, 72-l-, 726, \vherein it said, (after
pointing out that the terms of the statutes then1selves
described the po"rer to zone as a legislative function)
as follows:
9
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"Independent of the statutory provisions referred to above, no one could doubt that the exercise of the zoning po\\rer is definitely a legislative
function and activity."
That zoning is a legislative function was not decided
but simply assumed in the later cases of Phi Kappa Iota
Fraternity v. Salt Lake Cvty, et al., 116 litah 536, 212
Pac. 2nd 177, and Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corporation,
123 Utah 107, 255 Pac. 2nd, 723.
Being a legislative and therefore discretionary function, the motives of the Salt Lake ·County Commission
should not have been inquired into according to the view
of this court expressed in the case of City of Ogden v.
Crossman, 17 Utah, 66, 53 Pac. 985, 988, wherein the validity of an act of the Ogden City council was involved,
this court said :
"It is apparent that the ordinance in question 'vas passed by virtue of the express power
and authority of the state as authorized by the
constitution. Under such circumstances it "~as not
competent to prove the unreasonableness of an
ordinance by virtue of the conclusion of "~itnesses.
The regulation of the n1atter "\vas left by law to
the discretion of the city council and not to the
defendants. By granting the power the legislature
imposd upon the city council the discretion to
determine just how far they could go "ithin the
limits imposed and there is every presu1nption
that the council "\vere actuated by pure 1notives and
that they \\rere so fruniliar "~i th the nlischief
sought to be guarded against and the needs of
the city as to be the best judges of the necessities
for the enactn1ent of the ordinance and the extent
10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to whieh it was advisable or necessary to exercise
the po,ver granted. In such cases the council and
not the court is the proper repository of this
public trust; and it should be a plain case to
justify the court in interfering with the determination of the council or questioning their motives
in enacting the ordinance. Under the circunlstances, the court ought not to interfere on the
ground that the ordinance \Yas unreasonable, but
is restricted to the constitutionality of the act
granting the power. The ordinance itself proves
the exigency which existed which required its
enactment."
That this is the general and almost unanimous attitude of the courts in this country is indicated in an
annotation entitled ",r alidity of .nrunicipal Ordinances
as .A_ffected by ~lotives of Members of Council which
Adopted It," 32 ALR 1517. The author of that annotation begins with the following statement:
uit is generally held that the motive of the
legislative body of a municipal corporation, in
adopting an ordinance, is not the subject of judicial inquiry."
Then follo,ving are citations quoting that rule fro1n
1nost jurisdctions in this country, including lTtah.
The finding of the trial court as expressed in paragraph 11 of its "Findings of Fact" ,,~as clearly an invasion by the trial court into the motives of the County
Commission. Said finding is as follows:

"11. The action of the board of county commissioners of Salt Lake County in denying said
zoning amendment was unreasonable, arbitrary
11
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and an abuse of sound executive and adnlinistrative discretion in the follo\ving particulars: (a)
the denial was based \vholly upon the premise that
such a denial would protect an economic advantage already obtained by owners of other land
zoned commercially in the general n1arketing area
in 'vhich the land in question is located; (b)
The planning and zoning commission, after investigation, determined the amendment \\Tas necessary to best serve the population of the area
in question; (c) At the public hearing in the
matter no evidence of any kind \Yas presented
in opposition to the proposed amendment except
the testimony and statements of competing, yet
remote com1nercial users who opposed the zoning
amendment in order to protect their own economic advantage acquired by prior commercial
zoning." (R-29, 30)
The assu1nption by the trial court that the denial
of the comn1ission 'vas based \vholly upon any one pren1ise, and that said pren1ise 'vas one on \Yhich they \vere
not justified in acting demonstrates the hazards of atternpting to ascribe motives to the action of legislative
bodies. It is subrnitted that no one kno\\Ts and no one
can kno\v on \vhat basis the county co1nn1ission made
their decision.
The conclusion of the lo·w·er court that the amendment requested h~T plaintiffs should have been granted,
having been based largely on the above conclusion concerning the n1otives of the com1nission, is therefore in
error and should be reversed.

12
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POINT III.
THE DENIAL BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS TO ADOPT THE ZONING AMENDMENT WAS
NOT AN ARBITRARY OR UNREASONABLE ACT, NOR
WAS IT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE DENYING THE REASONABLE EXERCISE OF THE
POLICE POWER ON THE PART OF THE COUNTY COJ_\JlMISSIONERS.

The question of zoning authority and the authorized
use of the police power by the governing municipal
bodies, arose in Utah in the case of Marshall v. Salt
Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 Pac. 2nd, 704. In that
case Salt Lake City appealed fro1n a decision of the
District Court which ruled that the Mayor and City
council had acted arbitrarily in the enforcement of its
zoning ordinances. The Supreme Court reversed the
trial court which had held against the city. Part of the
language in that case is as follows: (141 Pac. 2nd 709,
710)
"The wisdo1n of the plan, the necessity for
zoning, the nu1nber and nature of the districts
to be created, the boundaries thereof, and the
uses therein permitted, are rnatters which lie in
the discretion of the governing body of the city.
Unless the action of such body is arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable, or clearly offends
some provision of the constitution or statute,
the court n1ust uphold it, if within the grant of
power to the municipality."
The court cites four cases in support of this point
of law. The case states further:
It is primarily the duty of the city to 1nake
the classifications. If a classification is reasonably

13
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doubtful, the judgment of the court will not be
substituted for the judgment of the city," and
further, "As to what restrictions and limtations
should be i1nposed upon property, and what uses
thereof should be per1ni tted, has been by the
legislature, committed to the judgment and discretion of the governing body of the city. As long
as that body stays within the grant, and purposes fixed by the legislature, the courts 'vill
not gainsay (its) judgment.
In the case of Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt
Lake City 116 lTtah 536, 212 Pac. 2d 177, the fraternity
sought to determine the constitutionality of a City Ordinance confining the use of premises in a restricted
residential area, for a fraternity or a sorority, to an
area not more than 600 feet fro1n the institution to
which the fraternity or sorority is an incident. The
court advanced several legal principals in the determination of the decision in that case 'vhich are in point and
support the contentions of Salt Lake County even though
they were construing the validity of an ordinance rather
than the refusal to amend. The following principles of
law were announced:
Exercise of statutory discretionary po"\\rer
to district and zone cities for various purposes
that are to the public interest ,,~in not be interfered "\vith by tl1e courts unless the discretion is
abused; and further The selection of one Inethod of solving the zoning pro blen1 in preference
to another is entirety "Ti thin the discretion of
the rit~T connnission and does not, in and of itself, evidence an abuse of discretion.
The 1nost recent cases in point in lTtah appears to
14
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be Dou'sc r .•~ alt Lake ('ity, et al, 123, tTtah 107, 255
Pac. :2d 7:2:~, deeided in April of 1953. This was a case
brought to declare a zoning ordinance of Salt Lake
City unconstitutional as it applied to the lots involved.
Plaintiff's cornplaint alleged that his land was unsuitable for residential property; that it 'vas located in a
potential industrial or commercial zone; that the zoning
ordinance as applied to his property, served no beneficial use, and in no manner promoted the health, safety,
1norals or general welfare of the community, that the
value of his property would be greatly enhanced if it
could be used for industrial purposes; and that under
these circumstances the zoning ordinance was so oppresive as to be confiscatory and unlawful. The request to
re-zone plaintiff's land was denied by Salt Lake City.
Accordingly, a consistency was established on the Utah
application of the Doctrine of Judicial Revew, with the
~Iarshall case, the Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity case and
the ,,~alton case with the advancemnt of the following
principles :
1

The wisdom of a plan, necessity, number,
nature, and boundaries of zoning districts are
matters which lie in the discretion of City authorities.
Only if action of eit~T authorities in creating
zoning districts is confiscatory·, or arbitrarily may
court set aside their action.
Complaint containing allegations that landowner's property might have been n1ore profitably used for commercial than for residential
purposes, that his property had become unsuit-

15
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able for residential purposes and that much of
property in other blocks in neighborhood was
zoned for commercial purposes did not show
confiscatory, discriminatory or arbitrary action
of city authorities ·w-hich \vould justify· judicial
alteration of zoned boundaries.
The character of zoning district as a whole
must be kept in mind determining whether health,
safety, n1orals or general ,,~elfare of district and
hence community would be promoted by permitting encroachment into residential area of commercial or industrial establishments.
At the hearing held in the Salt Lake County ,Commission chambers on the 4th day of N ove1nber, 1959,
for the purpose of having the public express their views
to the commission there appeared some fifteen persons
supporting the proposed change and some fourteen persons objecting to the proposed change. The ordinances
of Salt Lake ·County enacted pursuant to Title 17, Chapter 27, Paragraph 1±, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provide for a public hearing prior to a zoning amendment.
Such hearings is for the purpose of having the view·s
of the public aired before the Conunission in order to
give them the benefit of thinking of persons \Yho are
interested in the problen1. The nurnber of persons \vho
appear are in no \\~ay indicative of a cross section of
the public for or against the zoning arnendrnent, nor
is it rnaterial. The board is en1pO\Yered to make its
decision regardless of the reeorrunenda tions of the District Zoning Connnittee, the Planning Comrnission, or
the views of the rnernbers of the public \vho attend the
hearing, provided their decision is not in conflict "~ith
16
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the best intPrests of the health, safPty, In orals and
general welfare of the public.
'rhe evidence introduced at the hearing \vas clearly
conflicting. There is no sho\ving that those \vho opposed
the proposed zoning changes \vere interested directly
or indirectly in co1npetitive business ventures, nor would
that be material in a determination of this case. The
only co1npetent evidence \vhich touches upon the reasonableness of commission action is that dealing with the
traffic problem. It was stated that a commercial area
at the intersection of 56th South and 13th East would
create a bottleneck which should not exist. The comInercial area already established on 9th East and on
Hyland Drive will have the effect of deterring northsouth traffie, and the proposed 13th East expressway
should be left open to facilitate said flo\v of traffic
\\Tithout interference. (Testimony of Mrs. Rippe, page
60) There is no evidenee denying the reasonable exercise
of the police power on the part of the county coinInission. The court did not have before it any facts
indicating the views of the commissioners and \vas coinpletely in the dark as to what reasoning processes were
used in order to arrive at the decision reached.

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing Reasons, appellant maintains
that the trial court erred in overruling the County Commission and in ordering them to an1end the Zoning
Ordinances of Salt Lake County. Appellant respectfully
17
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requests that this court reverse the summary judgment
of District Court and allow this n1atter to be tried on
the merits.
GRO\TER A. GILES
Salt Lake County Attorney
LOUIS ni. HAYNIE, and
GERALD E. NIELSON,
Deputies, Civil Division
Attorneys for Appellants
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